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Bundling with Customer Self-Selection: A Simple Approach to Bundling Low Marginal
Cost Goods

Abstract
The reduction in distribution costs of digital products has renewed interest in strategies for
pricing goods with low marginal costs. In this paper, we evaluate the concept of customized
bundling in which consumers can choose up to a quantity M of goods drawn from a larger
pool of N different goods (N>M) for a fixed price. We show that the complex mixed bundle
problem can be reduced to the customized bundle problem under some commonly used
assumptions. We also show that, for a monopoly seller of low marginal cost goods, this
mechanism outperforms individual selling (M=1) and pure bundling (M=N) when goods have
a positive (even small) marginal cost, when users face costs of evaluating goods in the bundle,
or when customers have heterogeneous preferences over goods. Comparative statics results
also show that the optimal bundle size for customized bundling decreases in both
heterogeneity of consumer preferences over goods and marginal costs of production.
Altogether, our results suggest that customized bundling provides an efficient and
mathematically tractable pricing scheme for selling information and other low-marginal cost
goods, especially when consumers have heterogeneous preferences over goods or are budget
or attention constrained.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as a low-cost, mass distribution medium has renewed interest in
pricing structures for information and other digital goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Choi,
Stahl and Whinston, 1998). One common setting, faced by publishers, software producers,
music distributors, cable television operators and a wide variety of other firms, is when a
provider of a large number of information goods seeks to sell to a group of heterogeneous
consumers, who may place different values on the individual goods. While it is now possible to
efficiently sell individual goods separately for even small payments (Metcalfe, 1996), firms
may be able to generate greater profits by engaging in bundling, where large numbers of goods
are sold as a unit.
In theory, for N goods firms could offer up to (2N-1) possible bundles, each at a different price.
However, this problem is known to be computationally intractable and difficult to solve in
closed form except for small numbers of goods (Hanson and Martin, 1990). Recent work
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) has shown that when the marginal costs of goods are
sufficiently low and customers share a common probability distribution for valuation of
different goods, pure bundling (offering all goods for a fixed price) is optimal, greatly
simplifying the bundling and pricing problem. However, less is known about situations where
it may be optimal to bundle large numbers of goods, yet marginal costs and consumer
preferences are such that pure bundling is inefficient. These types of situations arise when
goods have a small but non-negligible marginal cost (e.g., digital video distribution on a
congested network), when consumers value only a subset of all available goods (e.g., music,
movies, engineering software modules, past news articles), or when consumers face costs of
evaluating goods that increase in the number of goods offered in a bundle.
In this paper, we analyze a pricing approach which generalizes existing results on information
pricing while preserving simplicity and analytical tractability, which we term customized
bundling. A customized bundle is the right for a consumer to buy her choice of up to M goods
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from a larger set N, for a fixed price p.1 Note that non-trivial customized bundling is only
relevant when marginal cost for each good is small and the goods share similar cost structure
otherwise, it will be more profitable to sell individual units. When consumer demand can be
characterized in a specific way, which is consistent with the assumptions used in some previous
work on information goods pricing, we show that the mixed bundling problem can be reduced
to a simple problem of non-linear pricing. This allows the application of known results to solve
otherwise very complicated bundling problems such as when individual sale can coexist with
pure bundling, when more than one bundle will be offered, how marginal cost affects the
optimal size of bundles, and the welfare effects of bundling. In addition, because customized
bundling contains unit sale and pure bundling as extreme cases, our analytical results can be
compared to and extend previous work on information goods bundling.
2. Previous Literature
The literature on bundling has a long history beginning with the observation by Stigler (1963)
that bundling can increase sellers’ profits when consumers’ reservation prices for two goods are
negatively correlated. In the two-goods case, offering both a two-good bundle as well as the
individual items (mixed bundling) is typically optimal (Adams and Yellen, 1976; McAfee,
McMillan and Whinston, 1989). This is because bundling reduces heterogeneity in consumer
valuations, enabling a monopolist to better price discriminate (Schmalensee, 1984; Salinger,
1995), while still capturing residual demand through unit sale. While the insight that bundling
reduces heterogeneity in valuations is quite general, other aspects of these solutions often do not
generalize beyond the two-good case.
Other work has extended the bundling literature to consider multiple goods as well as multiple
types. Spence (1980) generalized the principles of single product pricing problem to the case of
several products using a linear programming formulation, and shows some cases where the
1

Our definition is almost identical to “generalized bundling” studied by MacKie-Mason, Riveros and Gazzale
(1999). This mechanism was also mentioned as a possible strategy for discriminating between customers with
different willingness to pay (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1997; Shapiro and Varian, 1998), but this suggestion was not
completely explored in previous work. The earliest reference to this approach of which we are aware is Chen
(1997), who studied the properties of customized bundling using mixed integer programming, although variants of
this scheme have been used in practice in software and music distribution for many years.
2

problem can be solved in closed form. Other tractable analytical solutions have been found for a
variety of special cases such as linear utility (McAfee and McMillan, 1988) or when valuations
across different consumers can be ordered in specific ways or satisfy certain separability
conditions (Armstrong, 1996; Sibley and Srinagesh, 1997; Armstrong and Rochet, 1999).
These papers have found additional general results such as the observation that it is usually
optimal to leave some consumers unserved in order to extract more revenue from the other
higher value consumers (Armstrong, 1996) and that it is sometimes optimal to induce a degree
of ‘bunching’, so that consumers with different tastes are forced to choose the same bundle of
products (Rochet and Chone, 1998). These papers provide a general structure for solving quite
complicated bundling problems in closed form, although the complexity increases dramatically
as more goods are considered, making it difficult to extend them to large numbers bundling
problems.
However, when marginal costs are very low, it is often optimal to bundle all goods together
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) which leads to a dramatic simplification of the bundling
problem.

These “pure bundling” results are robust to any set of consumer preferences

generated by a common distribution function for the value of each good across all consumers.
However, when pure bundles are not optimal, such as when consumers are budget or attention
constrained or marginal costs are significant, this mechanism provides little guidance since
limiting the size of a bundle of this form creates substantial deadweight loss when customers
are heterogeneous.2
There have been several studies that have considered large numbers bundling problems in
specific contexts related to information goods pricing.

These studies generally find that

engaging in a form of mixed bundling where a certain large bundle is offered along side
individual sale dominates either strategy alone (Chuang and Sirbu, 1999; Fishburn, Odlyzko
and Siders, 1997). In addition, these studies introduce the idea that allowing customers to self2

The insight behind this shortcoming is straightforward. Suppose there are a large number of consumers that have
valuation for each of 10 goods drawn from the same distribution function. It is clear that if we offer a pure bundle,
all consumers will obtain their most preferred goods, although not all will agree which ones they are. However if
we are constrained such that we can only sell, say, a 5 good bundle, there are now 252 possible bundles that a
consumer might want if they can only have 5 goods. If any single bundle among the 252 possible bundles is
offered, as few as 1/252 of the customers will receive their highest valued goods, creating substantial deadweight
loss. Only by offering every possible combination that consumers desire would this deadweight loss disappear.
3

select the goods in the bundle (rather than having them predesignated) can often improve
outcomes while maintaining simplicity in the pricing mechanism (Chen, 1997; Chuang and
Sirbu, 1999; Mackie-Mason, Riveros and Gazzale, 1999).
3. Model
3.1 Introduction
We will examine the optimal bundling and pricing problem for a monopolist that distributes N
different goods to consumers. We are interested in examining the profitability of customized
bundles for a monopolist, in which a consumer is allowed to choose up to M goods ( M ≤ N )
for a single price p . In general, a monopolist may want to offer more than one customized
bundle when facing heterogeneous customers.

For notational simplicity we will use

m ∈ [0,1/ N , 2 / N ,...,1] to represent a fraction of the total number of goods available and
let p(m) represent the price for a customized bundle of size M = mN . In addition, for a
function f (m) we define the notation f '(m) as f (m) − f (m − N1 ) for m >

1
N

to be consistent

with the discrete nature of m.
3.2. Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing for Heterogeneous Consumers
We begin by defining a structure for the standard bundling problem in which customers demand
at most one unit of each good. Consumers purchase a bundle of goods x =< x1 ,.., x j ,.., xN >

(where the elements of x are binary variables, x j ∈ {0,1}, j = 1..N representing the purchase or
non-purchase of a bundle component) over all N goods available. Consumers derive benefits
from these goods which leads to a willingness to pay (WTP) W ( x ) , a weakly increasing
function in all components of x with W(0)=0. In general there will be more than one set of
consumer preferences over these goods. Let there be I distinct types of consumers indexed
i ∈ [1, 2,..I ] with a unique willingness to pay function W i (x) . The proportion of each consumer
type in the population is denoted by α i (where

I

∑α

i

= 1 ). If the price of a set of goods is p (x) ,

i =1

4

we could write the net utility a consumer i obtains from consuming this bundle as:

U i (x, p(x)) = W i (x) − p (x) .3

We denote the cost of providing a vector of goods x as C (x)

which is weakly increasing in all components of x . Using this notation, the general bundling
problem the monopolist faces is the determination of the set of bundles offered {x} and a set of
prices p(x) solving the well known mixed bundle pricing problem with heterogeneous
consumers (Spence, 1980):
I

max ∑ α i [ p (xi ) − C (xi )] s.t.
i =1

IR: W i (xi ) − p (xi ) ≥ 0 ∀i

(1)

IC: W (x ) − p (x ) ≥ W (x ) − p (x ) ∀i, j ≠ i
i

i

i

i

j

j

The first set of constraints, individual rationality (IR), guarantees that if a consumer chooses to
purchase a bundle, it provides non-negative surplus. In other words, the monopolist cannot
force a consumer to purchase the bundle. The second set of constraints, incentive compatibility
(IC), guarantees that a consumer segment receives at least as much surplus for purchasing the
bundle intended for them than they would for choosing another bundle.

Implicit in this

assumption is that the monopolist cannot price discriminate by group – it must be in the
consumer’s self-interest to purchase their intended bundle. This formulation treats the problem
as a direct revelation mechanism where consumers reveal their “type” through their choice of
product, which will yield the profit maximizing solution for the monopolist, if such a solution
exists (Myerson, 1979). Note from this formulation that for I consumer groups and N products,
the monopolist must determine the optimal set of I bundle compositions and prices out of
2 N − 1 possibilities.
3 3. Customized Bundling
Our initial interest is in determining the conditions under which the full bundling problem can
be reduced to the much simpler customized bundling problem. Following the literature on
information goods pricing, we will assume that the cost structure of providing goods to

3

The assumptions on W guarantee that U obeys the normal properties of utility functions.
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consumers depends only on the number and not on which goods provided, thus C (x) = C (m)
where m =

1
xi1 (where i denotes a vector dot product, and 1 is a vector of all 1’s). We
N

further assume that C is weakly increasing, with decreasing differences in m (that is, C ′(m ) ≥ 0
and C ′′( m) ≤ 0 ). Note also that C (0) = 0 , consistent with an additional assumption that the
monopolist has already sunk any fixed cost necessary to produce these goods. Given this cost
structure, we now examine what types of consumer preferences (utility or willingness-to-pay)
will yield an equivalence between the optimal bundling problem and the optimal customized
bundling problem.
Before establishing these results, it is useful to introduce some additional notation. Let wi (m)
represent the most a consumer of type i is willing to pay for mN goods (formally,

wi ( m) = max x W i ( x ) s.t.

N

∑x

k

≤ mN ). Note that this implies that wi (0) = 0, wi '(m) ≥ 0 and

k =1

wi "(m) ≤ 0 ∀i . Although there can exist as many as I such functions,4 in general there will be
less than I because different preferences W (x) can yield the same expression for w(m). We can
now formulate customized bundling problem as:
I

max ∑ α i [ p (mi ) − C (mi )] s.t.
i =1

IR: w i (mi ) − p(mi ) ≥ 0 ∀i

(2)

IC: w (m ) − p(m ) ≥ w (m ) − p (m ) ∀i, j ≠ i
i

i

i

i

j

i

This problem is the well-known non-linear quantity discrimination pricing problem with
heterogeneous consumers (also known as second-degree price discrimination; see Tirole, 1988,
p. 148-154). In addition to the mathematical formulation being identical, customized bundling
is also intuitively similar to second-degree price discrimination as it accomplishes
discrimination among different groups through customer self-selection from a menu of
offerings. The key distinction is that the non-linear pricing problem generally refers to different
quantities of an identical good, while customized bundling refers to heterogeneous goods with
4

In the context of information goods, it is reasonable to assume that I, number of consumer types, is much smaller
than N, i.e., number of information goods offered.
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similar valuations. Note also that this problem is significantly simpler than the full mixed
bundling problem (given in (1)) as it only requires a selection of a maximum of I prices from a
total space of N possible customized bundles.
An interesting question to explore is when we can reduce the complex mixed bundling pricing
problem (1) to the much simpler customized bundling pricing problem (2). Clearly, the two
problems are equivalent if they yield the same optimal pricing solution. The conditions for this
to hold are presented in Result 1 (all proofs are shown in the Appendix).
Result 1: The optimal bundle price schedule {xi , p (xi )} ∀i , is equivalent to a customized
bundling solution p(m) ∀ m iff for every pair of optimal bundles xi , x j where xi i1 = x j i1 ,
wi (m) = w j (m)
This result shows for every optimal bundling solution there is an equivalent customized
bundling solution as long as the willingness to pay function over customized bundles is the
same for all customers whose optimal regular bundle is the same size. While this condition
seems both abstract and rather restrictive, a surprising number of assumptions on consumer
preferences meet these conditions. Specifically, this will hold if all preferences over regular
bundles ( W (x) ) have a common customized bundle representation (w(m)).

The simplest example of this condition is when heterogeneous preferences map to a single
willingness to pay in customized bundles. For instance, if there are two consumer groups
(i={1,2}) and three goods (N=3) and the marginal cost per good is 0.25, the following two sets
of values for each of the three goods satisfy this property: {0.1,0.4,1} for consumer 1 and
{1,0.4,0.1} for consumer 2. This yields a WTP over customized bundles for all consumers of
{1.5, 1.4, 1,0} for m={1, 2/3, 1/3,0} respectively, and the monopolist optimally offers a 2-good
customized bundle at a price of 1.4, yielding a profit of 0.9. Chuang and Sirbu (1999) and Fay
and MacKie-Mason (2001) considered a more general form of this relationship, representing
consumer WTP by a linear function over their rank ordered preferences that satisfies this
condition. We examine in detail a minor generalization of their formulation in Section 3.5.

7

Interestingly, when there are a large number of consumers whose valuation is drawn randomly
from the same distribution function, as is common in marketing choice models (e.g,, McFadden,
1974) and previous work on information good pricing (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999), the
resulting distribution of preferences over goods W (x ) yields a common distribution of
preferences over customized bundles w(m). As shown in Result 2, the equivalence between
regular bundling and customized bundling holds in this setting quite generally, only requiring
that valuations of goods can be described by a common cumulative distribution function where
the expected absolute value of each good is finite, a common assumption in previous work.
Result 2: If each of a large number of individual consumer’s willingness to pay for a vector of
goods x ∈ [0,1]N is given by a vector v ∈ R N drawn independently from a common distribution
function with cdf F ( v ) with finite expected absolute value for all goods, there exists a
willingness to pay function for customized bundles common across consumers. This function is
N

given by w(m ) = E[

∑

k =(1− m ) N

X k:N ] where X i:N is the ith order statistic from F ( v)

Result 2 shows that to calculate consumers’ willingness to pay across customized bundles for
random distributions, one need only calculate w( m) = E [

N

∑

X k:N ] . The expression inside

k = (1− m ) N

the expectation, a linear combination of order statistics, is a special case of a general class of
functions called L-estimates (see a survey in Rychlik, 1998). The fact will prove useful in later
results we derive for random valuations.
3.4 General Solutions
We now consider the general solution to the generalized bundling problem (2). To solve this
problem, it is common to impose some additional structure on the variation across consumers
known as the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property. This assumption enables closed form
solutions and straightforward comparative statics results, and is commonly used in theoretical
work on non-linear pricing. Let a and b represent bundle sizes (different values of m), let
consumers be indexed by i and j, the single crossing property (SCP) holds if there exists an
ordering of consumers such that:

8

wi (a ) > w j (a )
wi (a ) − wi (b) > w j (a ) − w j (b) ∀a > b, i > j

.

This implies that a “higher type” consumer (meaning higher value of i in this condition) places
a greater value on any given bundle than “lower type” consumers. For all subsequent discussion
assume that customer types i are ordered to satisfy this condition. In addition, given any two
bundles, there is a greater difference in valuation due to size for higher type consumers (or in
other words, increasing differences in type and bundle size). While this appears to be restrictive,
it is a common assumption in most models of this type, and simply rules out cases where the
orderings of consumer value change as the bundle size changes. Moreover, it is necessary for
any general characterization of the solution to this problem.
Let {mi* , p i*} denote the optimal offering of the monopolist when there are multiple customer
types, and {mˆ i , pˆ i } represent the bundle that would be offered to consumer type (i) if there were
no incentive compatibility constraints (that is, if they were the only consumer type being
served). Using standard results and proof techniques from the theory of non-linear pricing we
can show the following Result.
Result 3:

A monopolist will offer a set of customized bundles that have the following

properties:
a) The lowest-type customer that is served is priced at their willingness to pay: p i* = wi (mi* )
b) The prices for all other bundles are determined to satisfy IC, and leave all consumers except
the lowest type with positive surplus (let imin be the lowest type that is served):
p i* = p i −1* + wi (mi* ) − wi (mi −1* ) < wi (mi* ) ∀i > imin
c) The highest type customer is always served at the size they would have received if they were
the only customer segment: m I * = mˆ I
d) All other customers receive bundles smaller than the bundle size they would have received if
they were the only customer segment.

These sizes are the greatest values of

m ∈ [0,1/ N , 2 / N ,...,1] that satisfy:
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I

I

I

j =i

j =i +1

j =i

(∑ α j )wi '(mi* ) − ( ∑ α j )wi +1 '(mi* ) ≥ (∑ α j )C '(mi* ) ∀i < I

e) There, in general, may be a customer segment such that all customers below that segment are
not served (that is, ∃imin > 0 s.t. mi* = 0 for i < imin )
f) The optimal size of the customized bundle is weakly decreasing in marginal cost
Result 3 replicates some of the well known results on non-linear pricing with a small
modification to account for the discrete nature of m. First, there is generally one optimal bundle
per type of consumer if that segment is served at all. Second, not all consumers are served with
since under single crossing it is more profitable to extract additional surplus form the “higher”
types than have them cannibalized by bundles targeted to the lower types. Third, only the
highest type consumer is served at their socially optimal bundle size, the rest being weakly
lower to discourage high types consumers from consuming bundles targeted at the lower types.
Fourth, because the monopolist cannot perfectly price discriminate, all consumers except the
lowest types that are served earn some surplus, an information rent due to their hidden type.
Finally, a more subtle observation is that without extremely restrictive assumptions on cost and
preferences, prices will not be linear in bundle size (with or without a “fixed fee” component)
suggesting that in general the optimal solution will outperform a two-part tariff (a formal proof
of this is available from the authors). All of these are a direct consequence of customized
bundling being a well-behaved nonlinear pricing problem under our assumptions.
There are also some additional insights these results bring that are unique to the customized
bundling problem. First, if cost and willingness to pay are known for each customer segment
(whether it is deterministic or the expectation of a random valuation), it is a simple calculation
of complexity O(I) to determine the optimal price and bundle sizes that will be offered. This
contrasts with the intractable mixed bundling problem of a large number of goods. Second, in
this formulation Result 3f provides a simple but powerful result on the relationship between
customized bundling, single good selling and pure bundling – as the marginal cost per good
increases, there is a monotonic shift between in optimal bundling policy from pure bundling to
customized bundling to unit sale.
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Customized bundling becomes increasingly desirable relative to pure bundling when consumers
bear additional marginal costs of consuming larger bundles, for instance, when consumer
attention is scarce and larger bundles require greater consumer attention to evaluate and identify
their preferred goods. Let Z i (m) represent the cost a consumer of type i faces in evaluating a
bundle of size m. Assume that Z i (m) is positive and weakly increasing in m with weakly
increasing differences ( Z i '(m) ≥ 0 and Z i "(m) ≥ 0 ). We find that under some mild assumptions,
the optimal bundle sizes are further reduced, making it more likely that customized bundling
dominates pure bundling as shown in Corollary 1 below:
Corollary 1: Under the assumptions above, if consumers face an additional (private) cost of
evaluating a bundle then bundle size is weakly decreased and prices are strictly decreased
compared
to
the
situation
of
no
evaluation
costs
if
Z i '(m) ≤ Z i +1 '(m) < (1 +

αi
I

∑α

) Z i '(m) ∀i < I .

Moreover, this condition will always be

j

j =i +1

satisfied if Z i (m) = Z (m) ∀i .

In other words, as long as evaluation costs are enough to matter in the optimal solution, and are
the same across consumers or at least do not increase too fast in consumer type, evaluation costs
will tend to yield a smaller optimal customized bundle (the weak inequality due to the discrete
nature of m requiring a certain level of evaluation cost before bundle size is affected).
Overall, we are able to use our formulation and slight modifications of standard results to derive
some interesting insights into large numbers bundling problems regarding the number of
optimal bundles, the relationship between pure bundling and customized bundling, the response
to marginal cost changes, welfare effects, and the tractability of the pricing algorithm. However,
these general results do not say much how customized bundling is affected by the nature of
consumer preferences over different goods, the existence of attention limits (a maximum
number of goods desired), or budget constraints. In the next two sections, we make some
specific assumptions about cost and preferences to enable us to study these relationships.

11

3.5. Bundling Under a Two-Parameter Preference Function
For this section, we build on results by Chuang and Sirbu (1999) (CS) by considering a problem
where different consumers can be described by a willingness to pay function that depends on
two parameters: an overall budget constraint or total willingness to pay (b) and the number of
goods they value positively (K). We denote k as the fraction of goods that consumers’ value
positively (that is k =

K
). Consumers are assumed to have similar utility functions over a rank
N

ordering of goods, which in the CS model is assumed to be linear in the rank order of their
m
preferences. We generalize this case to allow other relationships by assuming w( m ) = bi y ( ) ,
k
where y(.) captures customers’ relative valuations, or degree of preference, for different goods.5
Therefore we can write:

m

 by ( ) − pm
u( m, pm ) = 
k
 b − pm

if
if

m≤k

(3)

m>k

where y is such that y (0) = 0, y (1) = 1, y ' > 0, y '' ≤ 0 over the domain [0,1] (recall that this is
consistent with w '(m) ≥ 0 and w "(m) ≤ 0 given our definition of w(m) and that y’ refers to a
difference, not a derivative, to account for the discrete nature of m).
For any common function y(·) and any set of parameters {bi , k i ,α i } characterizing consumer
preferences that satisfies single crossing we can directly apply Result 3 to obtain the optimal
bundling solution.
To make this analysis concrete, however, we focus on a single consumer type and make some
functional form assumptions for preferences and costs (the multi-type case is also easily solved
under SCP, but adds little insight over the general single type case). Specifically, assume that

5

One can think y(t) as the proportion or fraction of total budget that a customer is willing to spend on the top t
percent of the goods she positively values. Intuitively, y is an increasing and concave function of t.
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there is a constant marginal cost (c) for all goods, C (m) = cmN , and that relative valuation (y)
across goods can be described by a quadratic function with a parameter (a) capturing
customers’ preferences across different information goods.

The quadratic formulation is,

perhaps, the simplest functional form assumption that enables us to examine the differences
between relatively uniform preferences over goods and preferences skewed toward a few high
value goods. Moreover, given the properties of the y function ( y (0) = 0, y (1) = 1, y ' > 0, y '' ≤ 0 ),
quadratic functions provide a reasonably good local (and often global) approximation to
arbitrary functional forms for y (⋅) while maintaining computational tractability. Thus we have:
y (t ) = (1 + a )t − at 2

where t =

m
∈ [0,1] and a ∈ [0,1]
k

(4)

By varying a, we can examine different conditions of valuation for a given consumer or
representative consumer across different goods. If a=1 then we have the CS assumptions
(linearly decreasing value in rank order). If a=0, the consumer values all goods equally.
Under this formulation we can compare the efficiency (ability to maximize social welfare) as
well as the profitability of different bundling schemes. In this example, pure bundling is a
trivial solution as long as the pure bundle is profitable (that is, b − C (1) > 0 ). The monopolist
sets price to total value (p=b) and extracts all surplus, although not at minimum cost when
k < 1 so it is not efficient (the monopolist incurs marginal cost to offer goods that are not

consumed). The optimal price per good for individual sale ( PIS ) is found by maximizing profits
subject to a constraint that the marginal utility of customers gained by purchasing additional
units of the good is equated with the prices paid:
PIS = arg max P PmN − C ( m ) s.t. w '( m) = PN
The optimal customized bundling solution is just a special case of Result 3 where there is only
one type of customer. Because there is only one type, we can ignore incentive compatibility
and focus entirely on individual rationality. Thus the price for a customized bundle ( pCB ) is
given by:
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pCB = arg max p p − C (m) s.t. w(m) − p ≥ 0

Note that the constraint is always binding at the optimum, so we can rewrite the objective
function as:
mCB = arg max m w(m ) − cNm
This equation is identical to the problem of maximizing social welfare and, thus, there is no
deadweight loss, so the customized bundling solution is efficient.
We summarize the solutions and results to individual sale ( mIS , π IS ), pure bundling ( mPB , π PB )
and customized bundling ( mCB , π CB ) in the following two graphs (detailed derivations appear in
the Appendix). For ease of comparison, we define w ≡

b
to be the average willingness to pay
kN

for the goods that have positive values. Figures 1a and 1b characterizes profit and bundle size
for various regions of marginal cost per good (c) and customer preference parameter over goods
(a). Note that since customized bundling contains both pure bundling and individual sale as
extreme cases, it will always weakly dominate. However, the degree of difference depends on
marginal cost and the dispersion of values across goods. As shown in Figure 1a, only when
marginal cost is zero is customized bundling and pure bundling equivalent in profits. This
continues up until marginal costs are equal to kw when pure bundling is no longer feasible
while customized bundling is still profitable. Finally at w(1 + a ) customized bundling is no
longer feasible. Altogether, these results suggest that the profitable region of customized
bundling expands as a increases (i.e., when there is increasing difference in good valuations).
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Figure 1a: Pure bundling vs. customized bundling for different marginal cost and customer
preference parameter
c
2w

c = w(1 + a)

π CB = π PB = 0
w

π CB > π PB = 0
c = kw

kw

π CB ≥ π PB ≥ 0
0

a

0

1/3

π CB = π PB = b

2/3

1

Figure 1b: Individual selling vs. customized bundling for different marginal cost and customer
preference parameter
c
2w

c = w(1 + a)

mIS = mCB = 0

π

IS

= π CB = 0
0 < mIS < mCB < k

w

0 < π IS < π CB = 2π IS

c = w(1 − 3a)
mIS = mCB = k

0

π IS ≤ π CB = b − ckN

0

c = w(1 − a )

0 < mIS < mCB = k
0 < π IS < π CB = b − ckN

1/3

2/3

a
1

In Figure 1b, at very low marginal cost and low dispersion of valuation across goods
when C ' = c < w(1 − 3a ) , individual selling and customized bundling are equivalent in number of
goods sold, which is the efficient solution. They also achieve the same profit level when a=0.
But as a departs from zero but is smaller than w(1 − 3a ) , individual selling is efficient but not
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profit maximizing. Note also that market demand (goods that are positively valued) can be fully
satisfied using customized bundling for a values three times as large as the case of individual
selling for the same level of marginal cost. Finally, as marginal costs increase, the size of
customized bundle decreases until marginal cost is so high that bundling is infeasible.
The key insight from this analysis is found from an examination of the “normal” case with nonzero marginal costs and consumers placing different values over different goods (a>0). In this
case, customized bundling dominates the alternative approaches, even when there is only a
single customer segment (except in the boundary cases where they are equivalent, m = k 6 for
individual sale, and m=1 for pure bundling). In other words, as marginal costs (c) increase or
customer heterogeneity across goods (a) becomes larger, it is increasingly attractive to
consider customized bundling over the alternatives of pure bundling and individual sale. While
pure bundling is only feasible when average cost drops below average budget ( c ≤

b
= kw ),
N

customized expands the range of feasible bundling to include kw ≤ c ≤ w(1 + a ) , and
customized bundling is strictly better whenever there is heterogeneity in valuations (a>0) or
consumers do not value all goods (0<k<1). These analyses are illustrated in Figures 2a-2c (see
remaining figures at the end) showing the profitability of the various approaches for varying
levels of the parameters (c,a,b,k).
All of these results hold for a single group of customers. The contrast will only increase if we
allow multiple customer segments since customized bundling can offer tailored bundles to each
segment, a strategy not possible with individual sale or pure bundling without some
segmentation mechanism.
3.6. Customized Bundling Under Random Valuation

6

m represents total number of goods sold to each customer in the case of individual selling.
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We earlier showed that simple customized bundling solutions may exist when consumers have
valuations for multiple goods drawn from a single valuation distribution.7 Since a number of
previous papers in information goods bundling have used such distributional assumptions
(especially Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, referred to hereafter as BB), it may be useful to
compare the customized bundling solution to the pure bundling alternative under random
valuation drawn from a certain distribution. Unlike BB who considered the effects of changing
the number of goods in the population, we will consider a simplified structure compared to BB
in which N is fixed at the largest possible number of goods. It should be noted that once N is
fixed, pure bundling is a special case of customized bundling.

We will retain the BB

assumptions of identically distributed vi (the value of the ith good) and their assumption of
constant marginal cost per good (which may be zero). In addition, all distributions considered
here are assumed to meet the conditions described in Result 2 (essentially finite expected
absolute value).

For the following results, it is useful to define the “Quantile” or “Inverse

Distribution Function” of a distribution function F(t) as QF ( z ) = sup(t : F (t ) ≤ z ) .
The most general result we can show for arbitrary distribution functions, including those where
valuation is dependent, is that customized bundling value is bounded below by mean valuation,
and above by an integral expression involving the quantile function:
Result 4: If the valuation for any individual good is drawn from a common but possibly
dependent distribution F(·) with finite mean ( µ ) then

∫

1

1− m

QF ( z )dz ≥ w(m) ≥ mN µ

There are two interesting insights from Result 4. First, the upper bound can sometimes serve as
a reasonable approximation for the value of customized bundling, as it can be interpreted as an
approximate average value of the portion of the distribution that exceeds the mth percentile.
Simulation results on many common distributions (uniform, normal, logistic and exponential)
suggest this approximation is good when the valuation of different goods is not too dependent.
Second, the result shows that the expected value of a customized bundle always (weakly)

7

This can be extended to multiple distributions as long as they generate willingness to pay functions that obey the
single crossing condition. However, this formulation yields few incremental insights beyond the single type case
discussed here and the general formulation in Result 3.
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exceeds the mean value of the same number of goods, implying that average valuation per good
of customized bundles under most circumstances exceeds the average value of per good of pure
bundles. The strict lower bound only holds when m=1 or valuations of goods are perfectly
correlated.
With addition distributional assumptions we can apply the theory of L-estimates to obtain a
number of additional general results. The most straightforward exact results can be obtained
N

when we further assume independence of good valuations, that is F ( v ) = ∏ F (vi ) . This
i =1

assumption yields an explicit expression for w(m) .

Result 5: If the valuation of individual goods is independently and identically distributed with
1

N

0

i = mN

quantile function QF ( z ) then w(m) = ∫ QF ( z ) ∑ N i:N ( z )dz where N i:N ( z ) = N  N − 1 z i −1 (1 − z ) N −i
 i −1 

(the Bernstein Polynomials).
This expression can be used to numerically calculate the values of the consumer willingness to
pay for arbitrary distribution functions and may be solvable in closed form for some
distributions such as the uniform and the exponential.

It can also be applied to make

comparative statics predictions regarding distribution parameters such as mean or variance and
the size of the optimal customized bundle.
Because the customized bundling profit function ( π (m) = w(m) − C (m) ) has a direct
relationship with the quantile function, a number of useful results can be obtained restricting
our attention to distributions in the location-scale family, which includes most common
distributions assumed in prior work such as the exponential, normal and uniform. Locationscale distributions are such that for a distribution with two parameters (a, b) known, we can
write the quantile function as QF ( z; a, b) = a + bQF ( z;0,1) where a is referred to as the location
and b as the scale. Using this definition and the usual assumption of a constant marginal cost
for each good (c), it is now possible to derive a relationship between location (proportional to
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the mean) and scale (proportional to variance) for an arbitrary i.i.d. distribution in this family
and the optimal customized bundle size ( m * ).
Result 6: Let the valuation for any individual good be drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F ( x)
with mean ( µ ), in the location-scale family with location a and scale b. Then:
a) m * is weakly increasing in a.
b) For general distributions m * is weakly increasing in b if E[ X M +1:N ] < c where M is
the lowest order statistic of the standard distribution for F ( x) (a=0, b=1) with nonnegative expected value. m * is weakly decreasing in b if E[ X M −1:N ] > c .
c) Profits are always increasing in m * at optimum
For any fixed marginal cost, an increase in location simply shifts the valuation curve outward in
marginal value-size space, increasing optimal bundle size (unless the optimal bundle is already
the pure bundle). The intuition behind the scale is somewhat more complex. Note that as scale
(variance) increases, the distribution spreads out. The highest order statistics become larger and
the lowest order statistics become lower. If the optimum lies in a region where the order
statistics are increasing in variance (i.e., when c > E[ X M +1:N ] , that is, when c is relatively large
and the optimal bundle only includes the very highest valued goods), then increasing scale
raises the size of the bundle. If the optimum lies in a region where they are decreasing in scale
(that is, when c is relatively small), the optimal bundle size is decreasing in scale. The
conditions in 6b guarantee the location of this optimum and that this optimum doesn’t move to
the opposite side of the curve as scale is changed.
This result shows an interesting relationship between the pure bundling and customized
bundling. When it is feasible to have a pure bundling solution (the average value greater than
marginal cost), then greater variance will decrease the performance of pure bundling relative to
customized bundling because it means that the lowest valued goods in the bundle become even
worse with increasing variance and thus will make customized bundling more attractive. This
provides an additional reason why greater ex-ante uncertainty about consumer valuations makes
pure bundling less undesirable. The BB explanation is that it slows convergence of valuation to
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the mean in finite samples which leaves consumers with more surplus. However, we add an
additional explanation that the goods being bundled on the margin under higher variance get
increasingly worse. We also show that increasing variance will decrease the size of customized
bundle when marginal cost is relatively small. Interestingly, however, in the region where pure
bundling is infeasible but there are still feasible customized bundles ( µ < c < E[ X N :N ] ) variance
actually leads to larger customized bundles and greater bundling profits in contrast to the BB
results for low marginal costs.
If we are willing to make stronger distribution assumptions, it is possible to relax the
independence assumption slightly.

While in general it is difficult to calculate order statistics

from non-independent distributions, simple expressions exist for the multivariate normal with
common correlation ( ρ ) .

These results are given in Result 7, using the same notation

introduced in Result 6b:
Result 7: The optimal bundle size and total bundle profits are decreasing in the correlation
among goods when E[ X M +1:N ] < c , and increasing in correlation when E[ X M −1:N ] > c where
M is the median.

This Result indicates that negative correlation acts similarly to variance, with negative
correlations raising the value of the highest valued goods, but also decreasing the value of the
lower valued goods. In the region where pure bundling is efficient we have another contrasting
result with BB – while negative correlation improves price discrimination ability of the
monopolist, it is offset by the fact that the lowest value goods are worth even less, reducing the
price discrimination gains of pure bundling and favoring customized bundles.
These analyses can be straightforwardly expanded to multiple consumer types provided that the
implied customized bundle valuations satisfy single crossing using Result 3 (or can be solved
by mixed integer programming when that is not true). However, this analysis does not yield
any additional insights beyond the individual contribution of Result 3 and the single-type results
in this section.
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4. Summary and Conclusion

We have analyzed an alternative bundling mechanism for low marginal cost goods that allows a
consumer to choose up to M of their preferred goods from a larger set N for a fixed price p.
Comparing to traditional second-degree price discrimination, in which firms try to solve p(x)
over 2N-1 possibilities, customized bundling is much simpler in implementation when consumer
preferences are such that the optimal full bundling solution has an equivalent customized
bundling representation. We further show that these requirements are satisfied by assumptions
used in prior bundling work, especially when consumer valuations are drawn from an identical
valuation distribution across goods.

Customized bundling yields a natural form of price

discrimination for heterogeneous consumers by offering a price-bundle size schedule that
includes individual sale and pure bundling as special cases.
Since customized bundling is simply an application of a well-behaved non-linear pricing
problem, it retains the properties of these problems including one type of offering per customer
segment, the “no distortion at the top” result that the highest valuation consumers receive their
optimal bundle, information rents to all but the lowest type consumers, and the possibility that
some of the lowest types are not served. In addition, customized bundles become optimal when
marginal costs are non-zero but not so large that the solution is individual selling. We also
demonstrate using specific representations of consumer preferences that customized bundling
can be advantageous when consumer preferences are concentrated on a few goods, consumers
have limited attention for evaluating goods in a bundle, or they have budget constraints (either
attention or financial). In addition, for the case when consumer valuations are generated by
common distributions we also show that uncertainty about consumers valuations (variance)
makes customized smaller bundles more attractive when marginal costs are low, but the optimal
customized bundle size increases in variance when marginal costs are high (in contrast to Bakos
and Brynjolfsson, 1999). However, unless marginal costs are zero and customers value all
goods, customized bundling will strictly dominate pure bundling.
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The advantages of customized bundling are likely to be especially relevant when monopolists
are selling large numbers of high value goods (e.g., movies) since it is very likely that budget
constraints are binding and distribution costs are significant, at least using current technologies
or when customers have heterogeneous valuations over different goods and do not positively
value all goods. Other markets that have similar characteristics are high-quality digital music or
modular packaged software (Office suites, e-commerce platform software, or the SAP R/3
system, for example). For smaller numbers or lower value goods, it is likely that pure bundling
will prevail, at least if consumers are homogeneous in the ways considered in our model and
those of our predecessors. However, even in these cases, customer heterogeneity is likely to
create opportunities for offering different size of customized bundles, as it provides a greater
ability to target different segments than individual pricing or pure bundling, which must rely on
third-degree price discrimination to deal with residual customer differences.
Given these advantages while maintaining a relatively simple pricing structure, it is somewhat
surprising that these mechanisms are not already widespread. However, there is increasing
evidence that these types of mechanisms are being implemented or could be favourably
employed.

In a field experiment MacKie-Mason, Riveros and Gazzale (1999) found that

librarians shifted toward purchasing journals through customized bundling (or “generalized
bundling” in their terminology) when this option was offered along with other more traditional
pricing schemes. Their consumption of customized bundles increased over time relative to
other pricing approaches, even when it was likely that preferences over journal articles was
largely unchanged. We have also identified a number of other examples used in practice.
Many firms offering engineering drawing software – a moderately expensive and modular
software package – offer modules in customized bundles (e.g., purchase a “10-pack” for $2000
or a 5-pack for $1250 where the consumer chooses from all available modules). There is also
the well known “10 CDs for a $1” promotions by firms such as Columbia House, which
represent the purchase of a customized bundle of around 14 CDs for approximately $75 (once
contractual requirements are met). At least one online movie rental club (netflix.com) currently
uses a customized bundling scheme – their pricing scheme allows users to choose different
plans that enable them to simultaneously borrow N videos for p(N) dollars per month where
multiple values of N are allowed (currently 2, 3,4, 5, and 8). The New York Times has
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experimented with a bundle pricing scheme for access to their article archives with four pricing
options, with which the articles purchased are chosen by the consumer: 25 articles for $25.95,
10 articles for $15.95, four articles for $7.95 or a single article for $2.95.8 This suggests that
firms are exploring the use of these mechanisms, although it is likely that many of the domains
in which this is most relevant have not yet seen substantial experimentation in pricing structure.
While we have specifically focused our attention to information goods, customized bundling
technique is not unique to information goods, and it is especially attractive when number of
goods offered is large but marginal cost and valuations are such that it is optimal for consumers
to purchase more than one good. For example, some restaurants have traditionally “bundled” a
selection of two or three side dishes with a meal where consumers choose from a specified set.
More recently, McDonalds changed their menu from traditional second-degree price
discrimination with fixed bundles (“value meals” with a sandwich, french fries and drink) to an
arrangement where customers choose two side dishes form a list of items.
In addition to the potential for practical use, our customized bundling analysis provides another
simplification to the general problem of mixed bundling that may be appropriate in some
circumstances. Given the complexity of the general problem, there has been tremendous
interest in the marketing, management, computer science, and economics communities for
approaches that yield tractable analytic bundling solutions.

8

http://www.nytimes.com/premiumproducts/archive.html.
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Appendix (Proofs):
Proof of Result 1
(sufficiency). Starting the program described by (1), we show that it can be converted to the problem stated in (2).
Consider any collection of consumers {i} where the optimal solution to (1) is { x } s.t. x ⋅ 1 = mN for all
members of this set. For every other value of m for this set of consumers, there must exist some x , with
i

i

xi1 = mN such that W i (x) is maximized, thus wi (m) and W i (x) = wi (m) for this set of x . By the sufficient

wi (m) = w(m) . We now establish an equivalence
p (xi ) = p(m) for all consumers in this set. If there is only one such element, there is a 1-1 mapping between xi
i
i
i
and m and thus p ( x ) = p ( m ) for that value of m. If there are two or more, then choose any two arbitrarily,
k
l
labeling them x and x . For both of these bundles, either IR or IC must bind, otherwise p (i) is unbounded.
condition, all consumers i in this set must be such that

Changing variables in the willingness to pay functions from x to m and applying the assumed condition we can

w(m) − p (x k ) ≥ 0
,
w(m) − p(xl ) ≥ 0
and
k
j
j
l
j
j
w(m) − p(x ) ≥ w(x ⋅ 1 / N ) − p (x ) ∀j and w(m) − p(x ) ≥ w(x ⋅ 1 / N ) − p(x ) ∀j . There are 4

rewrite

the

constraints

as:

possible cases, both IR are binding, both IC, and two cases where 1 IR and 1 IC binds. If IR is binding for both
then it immediately follows that:

p(x j ) = p(xl ) = p(m) . If both IC bind, then it must bind at some value j for

w(x j ⋅ 1 / N ) − p (x j ) is maximized. This value (call it Q) does not depend on k or l. Thus if both IC
l
k
j
l
constraints hold, w(m) − p (x ) = w(m) − p ( x ) = Q or p ( x ) = p ( x ) = p ( m) . The case where 1 IC
which

binds and 1 IR binds cannot be an optimum since it implies that Q must be both greater than and less than zero.
This establishes that

∀i, xi ⋅ 1 = mN , p (xi ) = p(m) .

Substituting for

w(mi ), C (mi ), p (mi ) for

C (xi ), p (xi ) and deleting redundant constraints we obtain the customized bundling problem shown in (2)
p(m) ∀m , suppose that there exists two bundles
x and x for some m where x ⋅ 1 = mN where p (x ) > p(xl ) . From the same type of argument shown
i
j
i
l
above, if at least 1 constraint (IR, IC) must be binding for each, this implies that W ( x ) > W ( x ) which
k
k
l
l
contradicts the condition W ( x ) = W (x ) = w( m) .
(necessity). Given an optimal customized bundling schedule
k

i

l

j

Proof of Result 2: (by construction) Proof (by construction). Let the ith order statistic of the valuation of N goods
given by F ( v ) be denoted as X i:N (where the largest order statistic is given by X N :N ). The random willingness
to pay for any consumer is

w(m) =

N

∑

k = mN

X k :N . This function does not depend on the consumer examined

(equivalence). For any given distribution there exists a distribution for each order statistic and summation is a
Borel measurable function. Therefore, there exists a cdf for w(m) for each m (existence). Finally, we know

E[| w(m) |] < ∞ since

N

N

i = mN

i =1

E[| w(m) |] = E[ ∑ | X i:N |] ≤E[∑ | X i:N |] < ∞ . Across each consumer, w(m) is

independent and identically distributed with finite mean (since

E[ w(m)] ≤ E[| w(m) |] < ∞ ). Therefore, letting

Q

Q represent the number of customers, average valuation

1
∑ w(m) → E[w(m)] as Q → ∞ by the Strong
Q i =1

Law of Large Numbers.
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Proof of Result 3:
The maximization program is given by:
n

Max

∑α

i

i =1

⋅  P i − C ( mi ) 

IR : wi (mi ) ≥ p i ∀i
s.t.

DIC : wi (mi ) − p i ≥ w j (mi ) − p i

for i = 2..I , and ∀j < i

UIC : wi (mi ) − p i ≥ wi (m j ) − p j

for i = 1..I , and ∀i < j < I

m ∈ [0,1/ N , 2 / N ,...,1] ∀i
i

Assume initially that all types can be profitably served in this market by an ordering of bundles

m1* ≤ m 2* ≤

≤ m I * ). We can show that only adjacent DIC constraints can bind. Define the adjacent

incentive compatibility constraints to be

wi ( mi ) − p i ≥ wi ( mi −1 ) − p i −1 ∀i ≥ 2
Now we will show that if the adjacent incentive compatibility constraints hold, then all the incentive compatibility
constraints hold. Consider any j<i-1;
i −1

i −1

wi ( m i ) − wi (m j ) = ∑ [ wi ( m k +1 ) − wi (m k )] ≥ ∑ [ p k +1 − p k ] = p i − p j
k= j

k= j

or equivalently, w ( m ) − p ≥ w ( m ) − p
As a result, DIC can be replaced by the adjacent incentive compatibility constraints.
After these simplifications, the original problem is equivalent to the following problem, ignoring UIC:
i

n

Max

∑α
i =1

i

i

i

i

j

j

⋅  P i − C ( mi ) 

w1 (m1 ) ≥ p1
wi (mi ) − p i = wi (mi −1 ) − p i −1 ∀i ≥ 1

s.t.

mi ∈ [0,1/ N , 2 / N ,...,1] ∀i
By substituting in all the IC constraints (which generates a recursive equation that gives all prices in terms of
willingness to pay) and collecting the terms together for each mi we can see that the IC constraints include a term
i

i

i

for w ( m ) for all prices in sequence above p and w

i +1

( mi ) for all prices in the sequence of prices above p i +1 .

i

Therefore and taking derivatives for each m yields

α i wi '(mi* ) − α i +1wi +1 '(mi* ) = α i C '(mi* ) ∀i < I
I

(C1)

where α i = ∑ α j
j =i

and at i=I, α [ w '( m ) − C '( m )] = 0 , because there is no group above them to have an IC constraint.
Therefore, the highest type purchases the efficient optimal bundle size. Two final issues arise – what is the lowest
group served and what happens when (C1) cannot be satisfied for a positive mi. An approach is to compute the
entire sequence of mi that arise from the program above. Whenever monotonicity is violated in the mi, say
I

I

I*

I*

m x* < m x −1* , a more profitable strategy is to pool type x and type x-1, that is set m x* = m( x −1)* . Note that this
action does not alter any other constraints, namely IR and IC constraints we have, in particular, the relevant IC
constraint to ith group, p = p
i*

i −1*

+ wi ( mi* ) − wi ( mi −1* ) = p i −1* + wi ( mi −1* ) − wi ( mi −1* ) = p i −1* , is still
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satisfied. (*) By inspecting the sequence of optimal sizes to the program, we could identify the relatively
unprofitable groups, those with optimal size smaller than that of their adjacent lower types, and then we pool these
relatively unprofitable types to their adjacent lower types and relabel the segments and adjust the size of each
segment, note that by doing this the number of bundles (prices and sizes) we have to determine is reduced.
Calculate the solution to this modified problem, if monotonicity is satisfied, then the solution is an optimal one; if
not, we run (*) again until monotonicity is satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 1: Substitute w ( m ) − Z ( m ) for w ( m ) in the proof of Result 1. The quantity reduction
arises from condition in Result 1d combined with the condition on Z’ above which yields a relationship of
marginal revenue is less than marginal cost and thus a quantity reduction. The last expression follows directly
i

from the fact that

i

i

i

i

i

α i is positive.

Proof of Result 4. Using Rychlik (1999, p. 108, eq. 11) we have that the trimmed mean of a set of random
variables
has
tightest
bounds
(for
a
general
distribution):

k
n

k /n

∫
0

1

k
1
n
QF ( z )dz ≤
E ∑ X i:n ≥
QF ( z )dz
k + 1 − j i= j
n + 1 − j ( j −∫1) / n
1

n = N , j = N − mN + 1, k = N yields ∫ QF ( z )dz ≤
0

.

Substituting

1

N
1
N
E ∑ X i:n ≤
QF ( z )dz . Multiplying both
mN i = mN
mN 1−∫m

sizes by mN and applying the definition of expected WTP yields the result.
N

Proof of Result 5: For i.i.d random variables, E

N

∑ ci X i:N = ∫ QF ( z )∑ ci Ni:N ( z )dz where X i:N is the ith
1

0

i =1

i =1

0 i < mN
then the first term in the expression
1 i ≥ mN

(highest) order statistic from a sample of size N. If ci = 
N

becomes E

∑cX

i = mN

i

i: N

= E[ w(m)] and the right hand term becomes the expression shown above.

Proof of Result 6: Denote the solution to the monopolists problem max m π ( m) = max m w( m) − C ( m) as
1

m* .

∫

From Result 4, w(m) = [ a + bQF ( z;0,1)]
0

N

∑N

i = mN

i: N

( z )dz .

The range of possible values

× [0,1/ N ...,1] ). Therefore comparative statics on the parameters can be examined
1
using Topkis’ theorem (Topkis, 1978). Denote m− = m −
. From Topkis’ theorem, we know that m * is
N
1
∂π (m) ∂π (m− )
increasing in ζ if
−
≥ 0 . Writing w(m) − w(m− ) = ∫ [a + bQF ( z;0,1)]N mN :N ( z )dz . For
∂ζ
∂ζ
0
(a, b, m) forms a lattice (

2

∂π (m) ∂π (m− ) ∂
comparative statics on a we have
−
= [ w(m) − w(m− ) − c] = ∫ N mN :N ( z )dz > 0 (the
∂a
∂a
∂a
0
Bernstein polynomials are all positive) so m * is increasing in a. For comparative statics on b the derivative of
1
1
∂
the difference reduces to:
[
a
+
bQ
(
z
;0,1)]
N
(
z
)
dz
=
F
mN :N
∫0 QF ( z;0,1) N mN :N ( z )dz . This is just a mN
∂b ∫0
order statistic from a standardized distribution. Define M as the lowest order statistic of the standard distribution
1
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with non-negative expected value. The comparative statics w.r.t. b depend on whether the optimum M * is
greater or less than this size. If the optimum bundle size is less than the M order statistic will be positive – this is
guaranteed if E[ X M −1:N ] ≤ c (note that for symmetric distributions with an odd number of goods, this condition
simplifies to a ≤ c ). By the same argument, one can guarantee the opposite sign for the order statistic at
optimum when E[ X M +1:N ] ≤ c , so M * is decreasing in b under this condition. Part c follows directly from the
observation that the marginal (lowest valued) good in the bundle must at optimum be greater than marginal cost so
contributes positively to profit. Thus, optimal bundles that are larger, must have greater profits than smaller ones
since profit for all goods above the marginal good are no less, and the profit contribution from the marginal good is
non-negative.
Proof of Result 7: Let Ri:N represent the ith order statistic from repeated sampling of the standard normal. Let

Si:N be the order statistics from sampling from a equicorrelated ( ρ ) standard multivariate normal. Owen and
Steck (1962) showed that E[ Si:N ] = (1 − ρ )

1/ 2

Result 6 we have w(m) = (1 − ρ )

1/ 2

E[ Ri:N ] . Using this relation and argument from the proof of

1

N

0

i = mN

∫ QF ( z ) ∑ Ni:N ( z )dz . Applying the same argument as we did for the

scale parameter in the proof of Result 6, we have that m* is increasing when sign

∂
(1 − ρ )1/ 2 ≥ 0 and µ < c .
∂ρ

−1
< 0 . Thus, the sign relationship between optimal bundle size and
2(1 − ρ )1/ 2
correlation is of the optimal bundle size is decreasing in the correlation when µ < c and increasing in the

Calculating the derivative yields

correlation otherwise.
Derivations of solutions under the two-parameter case:
Individual selling: Given a fixed unit price for each good, consumers will choose to consume additional goods
until their marginal utility (willingness to pay per good) is equated with the price of the good. Therefore:

P = arg max p ( P − c ) ⋅ Nm

s.t.

w '( m) = P N

When the solution is interior (that is, 0<m*<k) the optimum is given by:

b(1 + a ) + cNk
b 1+ a
c
=
(
)+
2 Nk
Nk 2
2
k b(1 + a ) − cNk
mIS =
a
4b
b 2 (1 + a ) 2 − c 2 k 2 N 2
pIS = PIS ⋅ mIS ⋅ N =
8ab
PIS =

π IS

2
b(1 + a ) − cNk ]
[
=

8ab

From this, we know that optimal price for each good in individual sale setting is determined by average willingness
to pay for all goods the consumers positively value ( w ≡

b
). Price is increasing in willingness to pay, skewness
kN

of valuation (a) and marginal cost.
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There are two possible boundary conditions to this problem that can be found by examining the behavior of m*.
First, if costs are sufficiently high then no goods are sold. This occurs when c ≥ w(1 + a ) . A second boundary
solution is when the cost-benefit tradeoff is such that all goods that are positively valued are sold. This holds when

1
c
c ≤ w(1 − 3a) or a ≤ (1 − ) . For example, when costs are below average value and all goods have the same
3
w
b
valuation (a=0), the solution is on the boundary: pIS = b (or PIS =
), and mIS=k, while πIS =b- ckN. As a departs
Nk

from zero, this boundary condition becomes pIS = w’(k)·k (or PIS = w’(k)/N), mIS=k, and πIS = w’(k)·k- ckN, and
there exists positive consumer surplus. This implies that when we have a boundary solution, individual sale is
efficient but not profit maximizing. When marginal costs are zero, we can either have a boundary condition when
preferences are sufficiently uniform (a<1/3) or an interior solution. When the solution is interior, there is quantity
restriction due to the consumers equating their marginal rather than total benefit with price – there is generally nonzero consumer surplus as well as some deadweight loss.
Customized bundling: Under customized bundling, the firm’s optimization problem is the same, but the consumer
individual rationality (IR) constraint is changed. Instead of the price being determined by the marginal good, total
bundle price (which is average unit price multiplied by quantity) is determined by overall willingness to pay. Thus
the firm’s problem becomes:

pCB = arg max p p − cNm

s.t. ( IR ) w( m) − p ≥ 0

IR is always binding to achieve profit maximization, so we can rewrite the objective function as:

mCB = arg max m w( m ) − cNm
This equation is identical to the problem of maximizing social welfare and, thus, there is no deadweight loss.
The optimal solution of this program when mCB is interior is:

mCB =

k b(1 + a ) − kNc
⋅
a
2b

with

[b(1 + a ) − kNc]2
4ab
(1 + a ) 2 b2 − c 2 k 2 N 2
=
4ab

π CB =
pCB

As stated before, there is no deadweight loss, but because the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate, there is
no consumer surplus either.
Again, it is interesting to explore the boundary conditions for this solution. Positive quantities are sold whenever:
c ≥ w(1 + a ) , which is the same condition as with individual sale. This is intuitive since the smallest customized
bundle is an individual unit. However, customized bundling attains its upper bound at a much higher level of the
cost and preference heterogeneity parameters than individual selling. The optimal customized bundle is the largest
necessary to serve all consumers fully (mCB=k) whenever

c
c ≤ w(1 − a ) or a ≤ (1 − ) . In other words, the
w

entire market demand can be fully satisfied using customized bundling for a values three times as large as the case
of individual selling. And even when all goods positively valued are sold in both strategies (customized bundling
and individual sale), customized bundling will yield higher profits as long as a is greater than zero. This implies
that customized bundling becomes more effective as a strategy when consumers’ valuations of goods show greater
heterogeneity.
Summary of results:
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Quantity (m)

Total sales or
bundle price
(p)

Profits

Pure
Bundling9
1 if

Individual Selling

Customized Bundling

b − cN ≥ 0

k b(1 + a ) − cNk
, k)
a
4b
if c ≤ w(1 + a ) , 0 otherwise

b if

if nonzero quantity then

b − cN ≥ 0

b-cN if

b − cN ≥ 0

mIS= min(

if nonzero quantity then

(1 + a ) b − ( ckN )
8ab
if c ≥ w(1 − 3a ) ,
2

k b(1 + a ) − cNk
, k)
a
2b
if c ≤ w(1 + a ) , 0 otherwise

mCB = min(

2

2

(1 + a ) 2 b2 − ( ckN ) 2
=2 pIS
4ab
if c ≥ w(1 − a )

pIS =

pCB =

b otherwise

b otherwise

if 0< mIS <k then

π IS =

if 0< mCB <k then

[b(1 + a ) − ckN ]
8ab

otherwise b-ckN if mIS >k

2

π CB =

[b(1 + a ) − ckN ]2
= 2π IS
4ab

otherwise b-ckN if mCB >k

9

We do not consider situations where a random pure bundle of size smaller than 1 is offered. Calculation of the
value of this type of bundle is a complex combinatorial problem and depends strongly on assumptions regarding
the distribution of values over each potential good combination. We know from the example given in footnote 2
however, that this type of bundle will always create deadweight loss unless consumer preferences over each good
are identical.
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Figure 2: Profitability comparison of the three approaches
CB
PB
IS

b=1.0
k=0.5
a=1.0

Figure 2a: Profitability of alternative
bundling strategies under different
marginal costs.
Results: CB strictly dominates the other
two extreme strategies when c>0. PB is
much more sensitive to marginal cost
than IS.

Figure 2b: Profitability of alternative
bundling varying consumer preferences
across goods

CB
b=0.9
k=0.4
cN=0.6

IS
PB

CB
IS
PB

Results: CB strictly dominates the other
two extreme strategies when a>0. The
relative performance of the other two
strategies depends on parameter setting.
For some parameter settings, IS is never
worse than PB).

Figure 2c: Profitability of alternative
bundling varying consumer preferences
across goods.
b=0.9
k=0.6
cN=0.6

Results: CB strictly dominates the other
two extreme strategies when a>0. The
relative performance of the other two
strategies depends on parameter setting.
For some parameter settings, IS can be
worse than PB.

CB: Customized Bundling
PB: Pure Bundling
IS: Individual Selling
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